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BUILDING THE CANON OF UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE UTAH PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING DOCTRINE
Jordan Dez*
I. INTRODUCTION
There exists an uneven dialogue between the Utah judiciary and the Utah bar
on pleading under the Utah Constitution. While the bench encourages legal
arguments based in the State Constitution, 1 members of Utah’s legal community
have noted challenges to succeeding on state constitutional claims. 2 When the bar
tries to make a constitutional claim, there is little case law on which to base an
argument, 3 and when the Utah Constitution is pleaded, the court will often decide
on other grounds. 4 The bar should anticipate few cases to support a state
constitutional proposition. However, in the interest of developing the Utah
constitutional canon, advocates should not opt for a mere footnote to the one case
remotely on point or undeveloped arguments relying on nothing more than the
plain text of the Utah Constitution. Rather, the brief that gives modern and
historical meaning to the text by using various interpretational tools that have been
offered by the Utah Supreme Court not only has a good chance of being heard but
also can push forward new state constitutional doctrine.
Since the 1970s, the Utah Supreme Court has given meaning to state
constitutional provisions independent of the interpretations of their federal
counterparts. This tradition is known as New Judicial Federalism 5 and, consistent
with this tradition, Utah courts have been departing from positions historically
* © 2014 Jordan Dez. Articles Editor, Utah Law Review, J.D. candidate 2015, S.J.
Quinney College of Law, University of Utah. I would like to thank Professor Michael Teter
and Christopher Stout for their thoughtful feedback and the staff of the Utah Law Review
for their outstanding work editing this piece.
1
State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“Until such time as
attorneys heed the call of the appellate courts of this state to more fully brief and argue the
applicability of the state constitution, we cannot meaningfully play our part in the judicial
laboratory of autonomous state constitutional law development.” (citations omitted)),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Tiedemann, 162 P.3d 1106 (Utah 2007); Christine
M. Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, UTAH B.J., Nov. 1989, at
25, 25–27.
2
Paul Wake, A Precious Birthright or Federal Porridge: Which Should Utah
Lawyers Choose?, UTAH B.J., Jan./Feb. 2007, at 27, 30 (“Sometimes, the Utah Supreme
Court has talked a good talk about its willingness to interpret the Utah Constitution, and
then resorted to the easy lockstep approach in interpreting the state’s constitution.”).
3
See id.
4
See, e.g., Weber Cnty. v. Ogden Trece, 321 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Utah 2013); State v.
Hoffmann, 318 P.3d 225, 236–37 (Utah Ct. App. 2013).
5
Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years after Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation
and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 175, 176 (1998).
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interpreted “lockstep” 6 with the U.S. Constitution, in favor of a more “primacist” 7
approach. When a state judiciary takes a primacist approach, they first turn to the
state constitution to provide relief. If relief cannot be provided under the state
constitution, they will then turn to the U.S. Constitution. 8 Conversely, under a
lockstep approach, the state judiciary will interpret the state constitutional
provisions to mean the same as their federal counterparts. 9 Under a third
“interstitial” approach, a court will only turn to the state constitution if relief
cannot be provided under the U.S. Constitution. 10
One example of a Utah court’s early participation in New Judicial Federalism
is the public interest standing doctrine, also known as “alternative standing.” In
Jenkins v. State, 11 the Utah Supreme Court introduced the public interest standing
doctrine into the Utah constitutional dialogue based solely on the respondent’s
briefing grounded in sister state law. 12 Previously, standing had always been a
question interpreted lockstep with the U.S. Constitution. 13 But as judiciaries,
including Utah’s, became more willing to depart from lockstep traditions, the stage
was set for success under arguments based in the Utah Constitution.
Since the salad days of New Judicial Federalism and Jenkins v. State, the Utah
constitutional record has developed, as have the tools for interpretation. This Note
argues that although the current Utah Supreme Court will show more restraint than
the Jenkins v. State court in adopting new doctrine, these developments have not
altered the court’s continuing commitment to the primacist approach. 14 The Utah
Supreme Court will hear and rule on arguments based in the text of the Utah
Constitution when they are developed beyond the plain dictionary meaning. The
manner in which the court utilized constitutional interpretation to develop the Utah
public interest standing doctrine and the Utah Supreme Court’s proposed methods
of constitutional interpretation from American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake 15
6

Jack L. Landau, Some Thoughts About State Constitutional Interpretation, 115 PENN
ST. L. REV. 837, 839 & n.2 (2011).
7
See id. at 837.
8
See id.
9
See id. at 839 & n.2.
10
Id. at 837.
11
585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978).
12
Id. at 443 (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974)); see
also Brief for Respondent-Plaintiff at 18–22, Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442 (Utah 1978)
(No. 17566) (relying on sister state law and an analogy to a Utah taxpayer standing case to
argue for a more flexible standing doctrine).
13
Cf. State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1939) (“This court is committed to the
rule that an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by parties whose interests
have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the statute.”).
14
The Utah Supreme Court is expressly primacist. Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake,
140 P.3d 1235, 1239 (Utah 2006); West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006
(Utah 1994); Wake, supra note 2, at 30; see Sinéad McLoughlin, Comment, Choosing a
“Primacy” Approach: Chief Justice Christine M. Durham Advocating States Rights in Our
Federalist System, 65 ALB. L. REV. 1161, 1162, 1169–79 (2002).
15
140 P.3d 1235, 1239–53 (Utah 2006).
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illuminate the historical developments in the Utah Supreme Court’s approach to
state constitutional interpretation. Drawing from these developments, this Note
outlines an approach that, if followed, will help practitioners build a more vigorous
state constitutional canon as they raise arguments in a manner more likely to be
well received by Utah courts. With this goal in mind, this Note will proceed as
follows.
First, Part II examines the modern history of interpreting the Utah
Constitution by reviewing the development of the public interest standing doctrine.
This history frames the current direction of textual interpretation. The doctrine is
evidence that the Utah Constitution is a vibrant and relevant document. Though it
shows that the court may be more conservative in its departures from lockstep
analysis, it is still willing to depart, particularly if the claims are based in wellsubstantiated textual arguments.
Part III, then, discusses what it takes to mount a constitutional argument in the
Utah courts. Though “plain meaning” textual arguments are sufficient to persuade
some members of the Utah Supreme Court, 16 the strongest textual arguments
should be supported with historical context that conveys the intent of the 1895
Utah voters and drafters of the Utah Constitution—that is, through an analysis of
the text of the Utah Constitution, the constitutional traditions of sister states, and
the society that adopted the Utah Constitution.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST STANDING DOCTRINE AND NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
The public interest standing doctrine is consistent with the modern trend of
state courts developing state constitutional doctrine independent of the federal
analysis—even in the face of contrary precedent. This trend arguably began in
1977, when Justice William Brennan penned an article in the Harvard Law Review
calling upon state courts to look to their own constitutions to protect individual
liberties in the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s conservative approach to these
protections. 17 State courts responded positively to Justice Brennan’s call,
beginning a trend referred to as New Judicial Federalism. 18

16

Id. at 1264 (Durham, C.J., dissenting). But see State v. Hoffmann, 318 P.3d 225,
236–37 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (“‘[S]tate constitutional analysis . . . limited to the truism that
article I, section 14 may provide greater protections to Utah citizens than the Fourth
Amendment’ fails to advance an adequate state constitutional analysis. . . . [Plaintiff’s
brief] does not quote or analyze the constitutional text, which our supreme court has
consistently held to be the starting point of state constitutional analysis. It does not discuss
the original understanding of article I, section 14. And it does not discuss historical and
textual evidence, sister state law, or policy arguments.” (quoting State v. Worwood, 164
P.3d 397, 405 (Utah 2007))).
17
JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF
FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 24 (2005) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977));
see also Milo Steven Marsden, Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State

1114

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 5

The public interest standing doctrine entered the Utah constitutional dialogue
in 1978, just a year after the publication of Justice Brennan’s article. 19 The doctrine
expanded the state standing analysis, going against prior precedent that had
interpreted standing as consistent with the Article III federal analysis. 20 The
doctrine began as a footnote in Jenkins v. State, 21 was then included as dicta in
Jenkins v. Swan, 22 and was later promoted to an alternative holding in Utah
Chapter of Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board 23 and City of Grantsville v.
Redevelopment Agency. 24 In 2013, more than thirty years after its initial decision in
Jenkins v. State, the Utah Supreme Court solidified its public interest standing
doctrine in Gregory v. Shurtleff. 25 The journey, however, from Jenkins v. State to
Gregory v. Shurtleff tracks the ebb and flow of the Utah court’s participation in
New Judicial Federalism, revealing a modern court that remains avowedly
primacist, yet unwilling to make drastic departures from traditional interpretation.
A. The Doctrine
Lynn Jenkins was a Utah man with a penchant for initiating civil litigation pro
se. 26 His lawsuits included claims alleging that public school teachers were
infiltrating the legislature,27 public officials were still practicing law, 28 and that he
was taxed too much because of the large land holdings of local religious
Constitution, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 319, 320 (noting the trend toward state constitutional
interpretation as a reaction to the more conservative Burger Court).
18
GARDNER, supra note 17, at 25.
19
Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1978).
20
See id. at 444 (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Plaintiff] did
not allege (or show) any direct interest or injury as a basis for commencing this action. In
my opinion this is fatal.”); Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978) (“The general
rule is applicable that a party having only such interest as the public generally cannot
maintain an action. In order to pass upon the validity of a statute, the proceeding must be
initiated by one whose special interest is affected, and it must be a civil or property right
that is so affected.”); State v. Kallas, 94 P.2d 414, 420 (Utah 1939) (“This court is
committed to the rule that an attack on the validity of a statute cannot be made by parties
whose interests have not been, and are not about to be, prejudiced by the operation of the
statute.”).
21
585 P.2d at 443 & n.3 (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M.
1974)).
22
675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).
23
148 P.3d 960, 972 (Utah 2006).
24
233 P.3d 461, 467 (Utah 2010).
25
299 P.3d 1098, 1102–06 (Utah 2013).
26
See, e.g., Jenkins v. MTGLQ Investors, 218 F. App’x 719, 725 (10th Cir. 2007);
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983); Jenkins v. Finlinson, 607 P.2d 289 (Utah
1980); Jenkins v. Bishop, 589 P.2d 770 (Utah 1980); Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443
(Utah 1978).
27
Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d at 443.
28
Finlinson, 607 P.2d at 290.
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institutions. 29 Surely the framers and founders would expect a good citizen like
Mr. Jenkins to grind his axe with the proper branch of government; however,
rather than seek a remedy through the legislature or local government, Mr. Jenkins
chose the expediency of the judiciary. Though perhaps Mr. Jenkins never got the
justice he sought, and was eventually enjoined from bringing further suit without
representation by counsel, 30 in parsing through his chaotic briefs to determine if he
had standing, the Utah Court of Appeals initiated a modern doctrine of state
constitutional jurisprudence: public interest standing. 31
Under the case and controversy limitation of the U.S. Constitution, 32 a party
that brings suit must suffer individual injury before he or she has standing to file
suit. 33 However, many state constitutions, including the Utah Constitution, are
textually different from the U.S. Constitution in that they do not include the “case
and controversy” language that moors the federal justiciability doctrines. 34
Under the modern Utah public interest standing doctrine, as stated in Gregory,
if a party does not have “traditional standing,” which is coextensive with Article III
analysis, a party may gain standing upon showing (1) the appropriate party has
brought suit, and (2) the dispute raises an issue of significant public importance. 35
A party is an “appropriate party” to bring suit if (1) the party is competent to
effectively assist the court in developing and reviewing the relevant legal and
factual questions; (2) the issue is unlikely to be raised if the party is denied
29

See Swan, 675 P.2d at 1153.
MTGLQ Investors, 218 F. App’x at 725 (“Because we find this appeal frivolous and
Mr. Jenkins’s pattern of litigation activity manifestly abusive, we conclude that filing
restrictions are necessary.”).
31
Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d at 443.
32
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
33
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
34
Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution reads:
30

The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts
as the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district
court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record.
Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.
Article VIII, section 3 of the Utah Constitution reads:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court of
the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over all
other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction or the
complete determination of any cause.
35

Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1104 (Utah 2013) (citing Utah Chapter of
Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960, 972–73 (Utah 2006)).
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standing; and (3) the issue is not more appropriately addressed by another branch
of government. 36
B. Departing from a Lockstep Past
When attempting to argue under the Utah Constitution, there may be no
precedent on which to base an argument, or the available case law may have
historically interpreted the Utah Constitution lockstep with the U.S. Constitution. 37
However, the development of the public interest standing doctrine shows that the
court is willing to depart from stare decisis if such an interpretation would conflict
with a “correct” reading of the Constitution and further exemplifies the inherent
challenges for the judiciary associated with the delicate balance between upsetting
once settled law and providing independent meaning to the Utah Constitution.
Jenkins v. State was a departure from stare decisis. Prior to Jenkins v. State,
Utah courts had interpreted standing lockstep with the federal analysis. After
Jenkins v. State, the Utah Supreme Court adhered to the precedent created in that
case. However, there is a back and forth, as seen in Utah Transit Authority v. Local
382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union 38 and Gregory, that shows evidence of a
court that is willing to depart from stare decisis when adherence to old doctrine
would lead to an “incorrect” interpretation. While Utah Transit Authority refused
to extend the public interest standing doctrine and attempted to entirely repudiate
the doctrine, 39 the Gregory court, in turn, refused to follow the precedent in Utah
Transit Authority, and limited that case to a mootness distinction. 40
In Utah Transit Authority, the UTA brought an action against the transit union
stemming from failed collective bargaining negotiations. 41 Before the case reached
the Utah Supreme Court, the parties negotiated an agreement but still sought
review of the case to guide them in future negotiations. 42 Both parties argued for
an exception to the traditional mootness doctrine under a public interest
exception. 43 The court refused to extend the exception to mootness and, in so
doing, held the public interest standing doctrine to be unconstitutional. 44 The tools
36
Id. at 1109–10 (citing Sierra Club, 148 P.3d at 972). The requirement of “the most
appropriate party” became “an appropriate party” in Cedar Mountain Environmental, Inc.
v. Tooele County ex rel. Tooele County Commission, 214 P.3d 95, 98 (2009).
37
See GARDNER, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that when state courts attempt to
interpret their own constitutions there may be no precedent on which to rely).
38
289 P.3d 582 (Utah 2012).
39
Id. at 590.
40
Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1119 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Gregory dissent relied on the reasoning in Utah Transit Authority, and encouraged the
court to “repudiate our prior dicta” on public interest standing. See also id. at 1119–21.
41
Utah Transit Auth., 289 P.3d at 584.
42
Id. at 585.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 590; see also Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1121–22 (“[T]he power we wield must be
‘judicial,’ we are foreclosed from making law or announcing our views in an advisory or
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of interpretation used were the text of the Constitution, history from the
Constitutional Convention, an inquiry into the processes of other states, and
judicial traditions in Utah.
Justice Lee’s dissent in Gregory follows the “model” set forth in Utah Transit
Authority. 45 Justice Lee argued that standing is a constitutional requirement under
the judicial power clause of the Utah Constitution, which reads that “[t]he judicial
power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court.” 46 Justice Lee used the
history and intent of the framers to define the scope of judicial power. 47
Furthermore, Justice Lee contended that under the traditional standing analysis, the
Gregory appellants did not have standing on either of their claims. 48 The dialogue
between the Gregory dissent and majority evidences the tension between departing
from stare decisis and giving new independent significance to state constitutional
provisions. While the Gregory majority adheres to precedent that has been
developed over a thirty-year period, the dissent builds on the precedent of Utah
Transit Authority. All of these modern interpretations both adhere to some
precedent, and depart from other precedent, all in search of the correct
interpretation of the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, the role of stare decisis in state constitutional interpretation may
not be as strong as in other legal contexts. 49 The basic issue in this endeavor is
whether the legitimacy of judicial review is threatened more by following a
questionable precedent or by completely abandoning precedent in favor of a
principle consistent with state constitutional interpretation. In his discussion of the
role of precedent in constitutional interpretation, Justice Jack Landau of the
Oregon Supreme Court notes that the process of giving independent significance to
state constitutional provisions will often be offensive to stare decisis because it
requires departing from prior holdings that assume the state and federal
constitutions should be interpreted similarly. 50
Still, a balance must be struck between rejection of incorrect interpretations
and judicial restraint. Professor Michael Paulsen argues that stare decisis is
contrary to an originalist reading of a constitution. 51 Even in the case where an
interpretive theory gives a prior judiciary’s interpretation the status of
constitutional meaning, by the same logic, the current judiciary, tasked with
interpreting the meaning of the law and constitution, should have complete power

other non-judicial posture. . . . [O]ur exercise of the judicial power must be in the context
of the issuance of ‘writs’ or in our resolution of ‘cases,’ a formulation that implies a
particular form for exercising the judicial power.” (citations omitted)).
45
Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1120.
46
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
47
Utah Transit Auth., 289 P.3d at 587.
48
Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1132.
49
Landau, supra note 6, at 838.
50
Id. at 867.
51
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence of Precedent,
22 CONST. COMMENT 289, 292 (2005).
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to overturn prior precedent. 52 As such, Professor Paulsen asks the question, “Why
last year’s judge and not this year’s judge?” 53
Though these commentaries are directed at federal constitutional
interpretation, the criticisms gain even more traction in the state context where
judiciaries are moving away from a lockstep approach and toward giving state
constitutions independent significance, and the corpus of case law is in its nascent
stage. 54 In the case of public interest standing, although the expressly primacist
Utah Supreme Court 55 has been willing to depart from prior precedent, the
departure is gradual and cautious. Under the public interest standing doctrine, only
when “traditional” standing does not permit a plaintiff to litigate her claim will the
court then look for alternative standing. 56 The dual nature of the doctrine—
traditional analysis followed by alternative analysis—is distinct from the standing
doctrines of other states and may signal the current court’s reticence to make
drastic departures from a lockstep doctrine. Alternative standing creates an
interesting paradox of state constitutional interpretation—it is primacist, meaning
that the court starts with the Utah constitutional doctrine of “traditional” standing,
but Utah’s traditional standing is the same as the federal standing doctrine. In a
sense, this doctrine is interstitial—alternative standing will only be an option when
standing is not granted under a traditional analysis. This doctrine evinces a court
that is not brazen in its New Judicial Federalism but will gradually incorporate a
new doctrine with a counterbalance of judicial restraint.
The history of the public interest standing doctrine reflects a more cautious
shift in the Utah courts’ state constitutional jurisprudence. The doctrine first
emerged in Jenkins v. State, where the court provided no explanation or
justification for the doctrine, just a citation to a New Mexico case: “Appellants cite
the usual rule that one must be personally adversely affected before he has
standing to prosecute an action. While such is true, it is also true this Court may
grant standing where matters of great public interest and societal impact are
concerned.” 57 The concurrence in Jenkins v. State went into slightly more detail to
justify the doctrine. 58 The justification provided by Justice Crocket was essentially
52
E.g., Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983) (“[T]he inherent role of the
judiciary [is] to interpret constitutional provisions.”).
53
Paulsen, supra note 51, at 292 (emphasis removed).
54
Landau, supra note 6, at 867, 869–70 (“The argument that precedent must give way
to a correct interpretation of a constitution presupposes that an obviously ‘correct’
interpretation exists. I have no doubt that, in many cases, that is precisely the case. And, in
such cases, if it can be shown that prior cases cannot be reconciled with the wording of the
constitution properly considered in its context and in light of applicable rules of
construction, the prior cases should be abandoned.”).
55
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
56
Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1103 (Utah 2013) (citing Jenkins v. Swan, 675
P.2d 1145, 1150 (Utah 1983)).
57
Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (citing State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick,
524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974)).
58
See id. (Crockett, J., concurring).
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based in efficiency: “to avoid delays and minimize the time, effort and expense of
further litigation.” 59
In his book on interpreting state constitutions, Professor James Gardner
comments that opinions of this era were often “surprisingly perfunctory and
contain[ed] little actual analysis or argument.” 60 Professor Gardner also notes that
the history of state constitutional drafting “has proceeded mainly through a process
of borrowing, swapping, and copying from somebody else’s constitution.” 61 The
origins of the public interest standing doctrine hail from this approach—
“borrowing” from a New Mexico doctrine, with “surprisingly” little analysis. 62
Looking to sister state traditions persists as a viable tool to support a textual
argument, 63 but it may not be given as much weight by the 2014 court as it was in
Jenkins v. State. The Utah Transit Authority court looked to sister state
constitutional law to justify Utah interpretations but used this tool in tandem with
others. 64 In that case, the court noted that many other states have adopted
constitutional provisions to allow for advisory opinions from the bench. 65 Utah
was in good company with other states who had prohibited advisory opinions. 66
The Utah Transit Authority court found this to support the proposition that Utah
was in the no-advisory-opinions camp, which was largely based on the framers’
statements during the debate of the Constitutional Convention that indicated they
disapproved of the judiciary making advisory opinions. 67
C. The Restrained Judicial Federalism
Five years after the Jenkins v. State opinion, the court pulled back from its
broad holding, changing the scope of the doctrine and its use of constitutional
interpretation. In Jenkins v. Swan, the constitutional arguments for the public
interest standing test were further elaborated and the doctrine subsequently limited.
Justice Durham, writing for the court, begins her interpretation with the text of the
59

Id. Though the Utah Supreme Court has used policy justifications for constitutional
interpretation in the past, see, e.g., Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d
916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993), this approach has since been limited by the Court to being
employed only to discern intent of the founders and electorate, Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt
Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240 & n. 3 (Utah 2006).
60
GARDNER, supra note 17, at 36.
61
Id. at 6.
62
Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d at 443 (citing Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975).
63
See, e.g., Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1285 (Nehring, J., dissenting) (“By 1895, Utah’s
debate over the wording of a criminal libel component of its constitution was a common,
perhaps obligatory, item on the agenda of state constitutional conventions. A canvass of the
constitutions of the fifty states shows that thirty-four expressly address criminal libel.”).
64
See Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d
582, 587–88 (Utah 2012).
65
Id. at 587.
66
Id.
67
See id. at 587.
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judicial power clause but then goes on to restrain the doctrine based on the
traditions of the federal and state judiciaries:
Unlike the federal system, the judicial power of the state of Utah is
not constitutionally restricted by the language of Article III of the United
States Constitution requiring “cases” and “controversies,” since no
similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution. We previously have
held that “this Court may grant standing where matters of great public
interest and societal impact are concerned.” Jenkins v. State, Utah, 585
P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (footnote omitted). However, the requirement that
the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is
rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in Utah. 68
The above interpretation is first based in a textual difference—the lack of the
“case and controversy” language in article XIII of the Utah Constitution. Justice
Durham relies on the precedent from Jenkins v. State but then looks to the
historical traditions of the Utah judiciary to restrain the doctrine. Interestingly, the
citation to the New Mexico case is omitted from the analysis, perhaps to draw
attention away from the “sister state” nature of that interpretational tool. Also, in
developing her arguments for the history and tradition of judicial power, Justice
Durham looks to the mainstays of the federal standing analysis on injury to justify
the court’s restriction of the doctrine. 69
Both the Jenkins v. Swan majority and, later, the Gregory dissent examine the
historical understanding of “judicial power” to pull back from the broad holding in
Jenkins v. State. 70 This analysis led the Gregory dissent to conclude that public
interest standing is unconstitutional and the Jenkins v. Swan majority to limit the
doctrine to an “alternative” standing—turning to it when “traditional” standing is
not available or when there is an “interested party.” 71
The alternative standing doctrine in Utah is distinct from other states that have
seized the textual lack of case and controversy to broaden their standing doctrine.
For example, the Michigan Supreme Court in Lansing Schools Educational
Association v. Lansing Board of Education 72 chose to reject its prior interpretation
of standing as lockstep with the federal standing test in favor of a historical
precedent that allowed for public interest standing. 73 In reaching its conclusion in

68

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1149 (Utah 1983).
Id. at 1148–50.
70
Id. at 1149–51; Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1122 (Utah 2013) (Lee, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71
Gregory, 299 P.3d at 1121–22 (Lee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Swan, 675 P.2d at 1149–51.
72
792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich. 2010).
73
See id. at 686–700; see also Kenneth Charette, Standing Alone?: The Michigan
Supreme Court, the Lansing Decision, and the Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116
PENN ST. L. REV. 199, 203, 206 (2011) (noting the Lansing court “held that in order to
69
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Lansing, the Michigan Court overruled Lee v. Macomb County Board of
Commissioners. 74 The Lee court had interpreted the relevant Michigan
constitutional provisions on standing lockstep with the federal test. 75 In contrast,
under the Lansing test, a plaintiff has standing to bring a suit if either (1) he or she
has a specific legal cause of action, or (2) the trial court, in its discretion, believes
the plaintiff to have standing for some other reason. 76 In so holding, the Michigan
court did not even address its early nineteenth century standing jurisprudence that
had limited the jurisdictional reach to deciding cases and controversies, foregoing a
“historical” analysis of its centuries’ old lockstep tradition. 77
Michigan and Utah courts’ standing approach may reflect differences in
constitutional allotment of power. By constitutional amendment, the Michigan
judiciary can make advisory opinions, whereas in Utah the framers expressly
withheld this power from the Utah judiciary. 78 Whatever the reason, although the
Utah Supreme Court is willing to depart from stare decisis, it seems more inclined
to do so at a gradual pace. The court will not make revolutions in its departure
from precedent. It will instead ground its decisions in the traditions of the
judiciary. The move away from precedent, however, can be done while wielding
the interpretational tools that have been developed over the past thirty years.
Although Utah’s standing analysis is not entirely distinct from its federal
counterpart, it is evidence that the Utah judiciary will look to the Utah Constitution
to provide relief. More importantly, the Utah judiciary is willing to depart from a
historical lockstep analysis if prior precedent is contrary to a textual reading of the
Utah Constitution.
III. UNDERSTANDING THE UTAH SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
In order to succeed on Utah constitutional claims, it is essential to first turn to
the guidance provided by the Utah Supreme Court. In American Bush v. City of
South Salt Lake, Utah’s teaching case 79 on state constitutional interpretation, Chief

adhere to its historical precedent, it was necessary to abandon the federal test for standing
and return to a set of prudential considerations”).
74
Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 699.
75
Lee v. Macomb Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 629 N.W.2d 900, 907–08 (Mich. 2001),
overruled by Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686 (Mich.
2010).
76
Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n, 792 N.W.2d at 699.
77
Id.
78
Justice Lee looked to the history of the Constitutional Convention in Utah Transit
Authority to support the position that the Utah Constitution does not grant the judiciary the
power to make advisory opinions. Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated
Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582, 587 (Utah 2012).
79
“In many states, there are opinions, ‘teaching cases,’ that set forth a general
approach to state constitutional interpretation, together with a number of specific rules.”
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Justice Durham, Justice Parrish, Justice Durrant, and Justice Nehring all wrote
separate opinions outlining their individual approaches to interpreting the text of
the Utah Constitution. 80 Justice Lee had not yet joined the court at the time of
American Bush, 81 but shared his views on Utah constitutional interpretation in the
majority opinion that he authored in Utah Transit Authority 82 and in his dissent in
Gregory. 83
In American Bush, after losing in federal court, the owners of nude dancing
establishments and lingerie shops challenged a city zoning ordinance on state
constitutional grounds under article I protections of free speech and takings. 84 The
justices took the time to address “the poverty of [] Utah case law” concerning the
Utah Constitution by elaborating their individual approaches to state constitutional
interpretation. 85 The American Bush court was required “to grapple with the
difficult questions permeating the debate as to the proper method to follow when
interpreting our state constitution.” 86 The four opinions in the American Bush
decision give sophisticated analysis of the interplay between a plain meaning
analysis of text and a textual analysis that is informed by the historical evidence of
the intent of the drafters and voters who ratified the Constitution.
Although Chief Justice Durham’s dissent and concurrence applied a plain
meaning analysis to article I of the Utah Constitution, 87 the majority took the
approach that plain meaning must be informed by historical context. 88 Through an
inquiry into the text itself, the state of the law on a national level—which is
primarily an examination of sister state traditions, and an analysis of the legal
traditions of Utah in 1895, the meaning intended by the voters and drafters of the
Constitution can be divined. Though flexibility may bring into question the
legitimacy of historical interpretation, it may also be a strong tool when advocating
for a particular interpretation of the Utah Constitution. The history of voters’
intentions was determinative in American Bush and boiled down to nude dancing
not being included in the public imagination of speech at the time of the

Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique
Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 193 (2002).
80
See Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1237, 1254, 1264, 1280
(Utah 2006). For another developed analysis of each of the American Bush opinions, see
Evelyn J. Furse, The Successful Creation of a Platform for Debate: Utah Chief Justice
Christine M. Durham’s Legacy Embodied in American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 75
ALB. L. REV. 1643 (2012).
81
Judges Biographies, UTAH COURTS, http://www.utcourts.gov/judgesbios/showGalle
ry.asp?dist=10&ct_type=S, archived at http://perma.cc/MT7Z-AGM9 (last visited June 26,
2014).
82
See 289 P.3d at 586–90.
83
See 299 P.3d 1098, 1118–27 (Utah 2013).
84
Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1238–39; UTAH CONST. art. 1 §§ 1, 7, 15.
85
Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1239.
86
Id. at 1255 (Durrant, J., concurring).
87
Id. at 1260.
88
Id. at 1239.
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ratification. 89 In the absence of a rich constitutional record, such arguments can be
influential in bringing a successful challenge under the Utah Constitution.
A. The Complications of Plain Meaning Analysis
In American Bush, Chief Justice Durham took a plain meaning approach to
textual interpretation. 90 Under this approach, “[o]nly if the textual language is
ambiguous or unclear should we look outside the words to external sources.” 91
Under the established Utah doctrine of the plain meaning approach, the words of
the Constitution must be given their “commonly understood meaning” if the text is
not ambiguous. 92 For example, the majority of the court in Utah School Boards
Association v. Utah State Board of Education 93 took the plain meaning approach to
interpreting the text of article X but looked to case law and legislative history
following on the heels of the ratification of the Constitution to divine that plain
meaning. 94
Chief Justice Durham’s plain meaning analysis in American Bush, however,
looked more to a modern plain meaning to determine the use of the word
“communicate” in article I of the Utah Constitution. 95 Chief Justice Durham cited
to a 1995 edition of Webster’s Dictionary and also the comparison of the text with
the language of the U.S. Constitution to determine the plain meaning of the word. 96
Justice Durrant, however, eschewed this particular approach to plain meaning
interpretation in his concurrence. 97 He wrote that there are three approaches to the
text of the Constitution: (1) the contemporary-context approach, (2) the subjective
approach, and (3) the historical approach:
All three of these approaches ask the question “what does the
provision mean?” The contemporary-context approach asks “what should
the provision mean in the context of our modern values and attitudes?”
The subjective approach asks “what should the provision mean according
to the interpreting judge’s own personal values and attitudes?” The
historical approach asks “what did this provision mean to those who
drafted and ratified it?” While the answer to the first two questions
would seem to be a moving target, the answer to the last one, at least in
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Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1264 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91
Id. at 1266.
92
Utah Sch. Bds. Ass’n v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 17 P.3d 1125, 1129 (Utah 2001)
(quoting State v. Robertson, 924 P.2d 889, 891 (Utah 1996)).
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Id.
94
Id. at 1241–42.
95
Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1266–67 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
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Id.
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Id. at 1255–56 (Durrant, J., concurring).
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theory, is fixed. . . . I believe that the appropriate question is the last
one. 98
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Parrish, also takes the historical
approach to plain meaning. For the majority, plain meaning must necessarily be
informed by historical context. 99 Additionally, a plain meaning argument will not
stand up on a meaning derived from the modern dictionary. Rather, advocates must
prove that the meaning was plain to the drafters and voters of the Utah Constitution
in 1895.
B. Historical Evidence of Intent
The American Bush majority put forward three steps to a contextual analysis
of the Utah Constitution that will ultimately inform an interpretation of the intent
of the drafters of the Constitution and the ratifying public: (1) analyze the text; (2)
support the analysis with historical evidence of the state of the law when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified; and (3) provide further context for a textual
interpretation with Utah’s particular legal traditions at the time of drafting, both
common law and statutory. 100
1. The Text
Justice Parrish first looked to the text of the Utah Constitution as the “surest
indication of the intent of its framers and the citizens of Utah who voted it into
effect.” 101 The majority reached the conclusion that article I, sections 1 and 15
were complementary provisions that should be read together. 102 To reach this
98

Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1239 (majority opinion) (“While we first look to the text’s plain meaning, we
recognize that constitutional ‘language . . . is to be read not as barren words found in a
dictionary but as symbols of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those
who employed them.’ We thus inform our textual interpretation with historical evidence of
the framers’ intent.” (citations omitted)).
100
Id. at 1240. Justice Parrish patently rejected previous approaches to constitutional
interpretation that considered policy arguments. Id. at 1240 n.3 (“We have intentionally
excluded the consideration of policy arguments suggested by Society of Separationists v.
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 921 n.6 (Utah 1993).”).
101
Id. at 1241.
102
Id. at 1241–42 (“The framers of the Utah Constitution divided the freedom of
speech guarantees into three distinct clauses. The first clause (the ‘liberty and responsibility
clause’), contained in section 1 of the declaration of rights, defines the scope of the
freedom of speech. Id. art. I, § 1. The second clause (the ‘governmental restriction clause’),
contained in the first sentence of section 15, prohibits governmental actions that abridge or
restrain those rights. Id. art. I, § 15. These first two clauses of general application function
in concert; the first defines what is protected, while the second defines the limits of
governmental action in relation to those protected activities. The third clause (the ‘criminal
libel clause’), contained in the second sentence of section 15, illustrates the limits of
99
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conclusion, Justice Parrish applied the “conventional method[] of constitutional
interpretation” that reads other provisions dealing with the same topic to determine
the meaning of a textual provision. 103 Like Chief Justice Durham, Justice Parrish
also compared the text of the Utah Constitution to the U.S. Constitution, noting the
lack of specific language in the latter. 104 After determining that the different
constitutional provisions on speech are to be read together, Justice Parrish looked
to the constitutional traditions of sister states in 1895 to discern the meaning of
substantive provisions.
2. Sister State Constitutional Traditions
Appellant, American Bush, argued that article I of the Utah Constitution
provided more protection for speech than the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. 105 In judging this proposition, Justice Parrish situated Utah within the
history of speech clauses in sister states around the nation. She noted two distinct
trends in state constitutional speech clauses. The first is from the colonies
immediately after the Revolutionary War. At that time, states were basing their
speech provisions on a series of letters by Trenchard and Gordon known as Cato’s
Letters, “that argued for more extensive rights of expression without fear of
government reprisal.” 106 The Utah speech clauses are not so expansive, however,
for they contain language limiting speech by making individuals “responsible for
the abuse” of the right. 107 The majority noted that this language derives from
William Blackstone, whose philosophy on the press advocated for no restraint of
publication but did provide punishment for abuses of liberty. 108 This argument is
reinforced by a citation to a California case that is contemporaneous to the
ratification of the Utah Constitution that attributes California’s similar
constitutional language to Blackstone. 109 This deep look into the state of the law in
1895 led the majority to the general conclusion that Utah’s protection for speech is
not necessarily more expansive than its federal counterpart because it contains
limiting language that is not present in the U.S. Constitution. 110
In contrast, in his dissent, Justice Nehring looked to the history of the press at
the time of the Constitutional Convention, as well as the tradition of sister states
and concluded that “[b]y 1895, Utah’s debate over the wording of a criminal libel
component of its constitution was a common, perhaps obligatory, item on the

governmental action, and by inference the scope of individual freedoms, in the specific
instance of criminal libel prosecutions.”).
103
Id.
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Id. at 1242–43.
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Id. at 1238–39.
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Id. at 1246.
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Id. at 1247.
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Id. at 1245.
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Id. at 1248 n.13.
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See id. at 1248.
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agenda of state constitutional conventions,” and did not signify a commitment to a
Blackstonian constitutional agenda. 111
In addition to using sister state constitutions to contextualize the intent of the
framers in 1895, sister state constitutional jurisprudence is also called upon when
those courts interpret constitutional language similar to that of Utah. Justice Parrish
cited Colorado, Indiana, and Tennessee case law that applied a similar textual
approach to constitutional language similar to that of Utah and concluded that their
states’ constitutions did not protect obscenity. 112 Conversely, Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion cited to a modern case from Oregon that interpreted a speech
clause similar to Utah’s to protect speech similar to that present in American
Bush. 113 Though looking to sister state interpretations does not lead to absolute
results in textual interpretation, it does provide advocates with forty-nine different
possible arguments to support a proposition.
3. Historical Context of the Ratifying Society
(a) Voters’ Intentions
Unlike the federal constitution, the electorate, not the drafters, ratified state
constitutions. 114 Therefore, in construing state constitutions, courts may look to the
intention of the drafters and, more importantly, to the intentions of the voters 115:
Through the process of voting for the constitution on November 5,
1895, the citizens of Utah circumscribed the limits beyond which their
elected officials may not tread. As ‘[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people,’ Utah Const. art. I, § 2, only Utah’s citizens themselves had the
right to limit their own sovereign power to act through their elected
officials. Judicial officers may not substitute their own wisdom for that
of the people of Utah inasmuch as the citizens limited the actions of their
elected officials in certain areas but left them free in other areas to
exercise their judgment in representing their constituents. To do so
would be to deny political powers to the citizens of Utah that they in
their wisdom and judgment had retained for themselves. 116
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Id. at 1285 (Nehring, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1252 (majority opinion).
113
Id. at 1274 (Durham, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Williams, supra note 79, at 194–96.
115
Landau, supra note 6, at 862–63 (“The authoritative character of state constitutions
derives from their adoption by a vote of the people, not from the views of their drafters.
Thus, it should be the views of the voters who adopted state constitutions that should be the
focus of the interpretation of those documents. Evidence about what framers or drafters had
in mind might be relevant; the framers were themselves voters, and their views might have
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This is the driving force of Justice Parrish’s opinion in American Bush. The court
ultimately concluded that in light of the clear disapproval the people of Utah had
for nude dancing at the time of the adoption of the Utah Constitution, nude dancing
was not a form of expressive communication that the electorate intended to protect
by means of article I of the Utah Constitution. 117
Though it is often difficult to generalize what the entire group of voters is
thinking when they ratify a constitution, 118 the common law and statutes of 1895
provide “the clearest picture” of the intentions of the drafters and voters of the
time. 119 Justice Parrish cited to a statute that was enacted shortly after the
Constitution was ratified that made “it a crime to ‘employ any female to dance,
promenade, or otherwise exhibit herself’ in any ‘saloon, dance cellar, or dance
room, public garden, public highway, or in any place whatsoever, theatres
excepted,’ or for a female to engage in such activity.” 120 Thus, the legislature
elected by the ratifying public reaffirmed that it was within their power to prohibit
nudity. 121 In light of this evidence, the majority concluded that article I of the Utah
Constitution was not intended to protect nude dancing. 122
(b) The Utah Constitutional Convention
When interpreting the Utah Constitution, the justices rely on the record from
Utah’s Constitutional Convention to varying degrees. For example, Justice Parrish
considered the Constitutional Convention to be one source for identifying the
meaning of constitutional provisions in American Bush. 123 But, she also noted that
the record of discussion and vote counts did not convey the mindset of all the men
that voted. 124 Specifically, Justice Parrish examined the debate and votes on two
amendments that were proposed and rejected during the Convention. 125 The first
proposed amendment she reviewed exemplified one of the weaknesses of
reviewing the convention record, namely the frequent problem that vote counts and
competing floor statements can be interpreted to support multiple conflicting
117

Id. at 1254.
These arguments do not always apply with equal force in the case of state
constitutional interpretation because of the rich record of recent amendments and recorded
intentions of the framers. Landau, supra note 6, at 862. For a good explanation of the
history of the Utah Constitutional Convention and ratification process, see generally JEAN
BICKMORE WHITE, CHARTER FOR STATEHOOD: THE STORY OF UTAH’S STATE
CONSTITUTION (1996); see also Paul Wake, Fundamental Principles, Individual Rights,
and Free Government: Do Utahns Remember How to Be Free?, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 661,
662.
119
Am. Bush, 140 P.3d at 1250.
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conclusions. 126 The second proposed amendment was more susceptible to a single
interpretation, but while Justice Parrish found it helpful in the analysis, it was by
no means the main thrust of her opinion. 127
For Justice Lee, the intent of the drafters is central to the state constitutional
inquiry. And to identify intent, Justice Lee turned to the Utah Constitutional
Convention in his majority opinion in Utah Transit Authority:
During the course of the state’s constitutional convention, delegate
Thomas Maloney proposed an amendment to article VIII that would have
expressly authorized the Utah Supreme Court to issue advisory opinions
when requested by the governor or legislature. When questioned why he
would propose such a clause, Maloney responded that it had “worked
well” in other states (including Massachusetts, Maine, and Colorado) and
that the legislature “may want an opinion” on matters of significance.
Two other delegates voiced their objection to the proposed amendment,
however, and it was roundly rejected by the body of the convention. 128
Based on these statements, Justice Lee later argued in his Gregory dissent that a
constitutional amendment would be necessary to create the public interest standing
doctrine. 129
By contrast, Justice Durham’s majority opinion in Gregory did not address
the framers’ intentions, 130 nor did the historical cases that developed the public
interest standing doctrine use this interpretational tool. 131 The Gregory court
instead responded:
At the state level, the recognition of an alternative form of standing is
simply not the type of jurisprudential development which is predicated
on explicit constitutional authorization. The dissent suggests that this
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Id. at 1248–49
Id. at 1250.
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Utah Transit Auth. v. Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union, 289 P.3d 582,
587 (Utah 2012) (citations omitted).
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Gregory v. Shurtleff, 299 P.3d 1098, 1121 (Utah 2013).
130
In response to the dissent’s argument that the framers explicitly withheld the
authority to issue advisory opinions, thus not intending public interest standing, Justice
Durham responded for the majority with arguments grounded in sister state law:
127

We . . . align with the courts of numerous other states in determining that the
lack of a ‘‘case or controversy’’ requirement in our state constitution permits the
development of alternative, public-interest standing doctrines.
E.g. id. at 1105 n.9.
131
See, e.g., Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983).
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court requires explicit textual authorization to articulate the scope of the
judicial power to assess standing. We reject this view. 132
If intent can be surmised from the records of the Constitutional Convention, such
intent would be helpful to an argument, but by no means necessary.
(c) Jurisprudential Philosophy
Although Justice Parrish does not give much weight to the “discussion” of the
Constitutional Convention, the legal treatises that are referenced in the
Constitutional Convention are cited throughout American Bush. 133 Particularly,
Justice Nehring and Justice Parrish cite passages from Thomas Cooley to support
the proposition that the Constitution is derived from natural law, or that the rights
and powers of the Constitution existed before the document was created.
[A state constitution] is not the beginning of a community, nor the origin
of private rights; it is not the fountain of law, nor the incipient state of
government; it is not the cause, but consequence, of personal and
political freedom; it grants no rights to the people, but is the creature of
their power, the instrument of their convenience. 134
Justice Nehring inquires into the jurisprudential philosophies of the drafters to
determine their intent. 135 Unlike the majority, Justice Nehring determines that the
philosophy behind article I, section 15 of the Constitution and article I, section 1
was not Blackstonian. Rather, Justice Nehring capitalizes on the Thomas Cooley
reference to a natural rights approach throughout the speech clauses:
I reach my conclusion, therefore, that the text and history of article
I, section 1 and article I, section 15 manifest the intention of the framers
to protect the expansive rights of expression inherent to every person,
independent of governmental intrusions justified by Blackstonian
philosophy or by extrapolation from the criminal libel provisions of
article I, section 15. I am therefore convinced that the majority is wrong
in concluding that the men who drafted and ratified the Utah Constitution
intended the “responsibility for abuse” provision to empower the
government to restrict “immoral” speech.136
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From Justice Nehring’s interpretation, as well as the majority’s Blackstonian
interpretation, we see that arguing the jurisprudential philosophies may also gain
traction at the Utah Supreme Court. Like the play between voters’ intention and
drafters’ intention, there is room here for advocates to move.
Also illuminating from Justice Nehring is that he ultimately yearns for the
lockstep days:
If there is one other matter upon which the majority and the Chief
Justice are in accord, it is in their dissatisfaction with federal First
Amendment jurisprudence. I am far less troubled by it. In fact, I have
come away from this appeal with a newfound sympathy for it. The
attraction of the federal First Amendment approach may have more to do
with my unease over the alternatives proposed by my colleagues . . . . I
have, therefore, come to be convinced that there is merit in the federal
“intermediate scrutiny” model and that we should incorporate it into our
analytical approach to the regulation of free expression under the Utah
Constitution. 137
It has also been posited that Justice Nehring has a more interstitial approach to
constitutional interpretation. 138
The tools presented in American Bush are malleable. The sheer volume of
approaches in the opinion substantiates the claim that a simple footnote to a plain
meaning argument is not what the court is requesting. With this collection of
interpretational tools, none is particularly essential to success. What will get the
attention of the court is an argument using as many of these tools as possible.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the current era of Utah constitutional case law, the legal community will
have to be creative—and even deviceful—to piece together compelling briefs to
argue cases under the Utah Constitution. In contrast to the early days of New
Judicial Federalism where the court introduced new interpretations into the Utah
constitutional dialogue from nothing more than a party’s citation to sister state law,
sophisticated briefing is now necessary to succeed on a Utah Constitutional claim.
Even where there is little case law or unfavorable prior precedents, practitioners
may still find success by raising arguments grounded in the text of the Utah
Constitution and supported by those sources the court has identified as useful for
interpreting its text. The strongest textual arguments will be those supported by
historical evidence of the intent of the 1895 Utah voters and drafters of the Utah
Constitution, analysis of the constitutional traditions of sister states, and the history
of the society that adopted the Utah Constitution.
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